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„To put oneself into the other fellow’s place’1 
 
Nicholas J. Wheeler 
 
Abstract 
It is well known in the literature on security dilemma theorising that John Herz 
coined the concept in the early 1950s with Herbert Butterfield developing a very 
similar concept at the same time.  What is less well appreciated is that Butterfield 
powerfully argued in his 1951 book History and Human Relations that there was 
no prospect of state leaders and diplomats overcoming the dynamics of mutual 
suspicion and distrust that created what he had chosen to call a condition of 
„Hobbesian fear.‟  Herz parted company with Butterfield on this fundamental 
question, considering that two adversaries could come to appreciate that what 
they perceived as the other‟s hostile behaviour was a defensive response to their 
own actions.  This article revisits this fundamental question that divided the 
pioneer theorists of the security dilemma as to whether better mutual 
understanding between potential rivals might be the key to mitigating fear-based 
hostility.  The article discusses this question in relation to Herz‟s ideas about 
surviving the nuclear age, and shows how he believed that knowledge of the 
security dilemma was critical if the superpowers were to mitigate their security 
competition.  Having examined how far the end of the Cold War supports Herz‟s 
position, the article concludes by showing how Herz became increasingly 
disillusioned that the United States was capable of acting to mitigate the security 
dilemma in the post-Cold War world. 
 
Keywords: security dilemma, security dilemma dynamics, security dilemma 
sensibility, mitigation, uncertainty, nuclear weapons, ideological fundamentalism.  
 
This article revisits the fundamental question that divided John Herz and Herbert 
Butterfield, the inventers of the concept of the security dilemma: Is a better 
understanding of the security dilemma the key to mitigating it?  Or is distrust 
fatalistically inevitable?  I discuss this question in relation to Herz‟s ideas about 
surviving the nuclear age, and show how he believed that mutual security 
between the superpowers depended upon them recognising that their own actions 
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were provoking fear and distrust in their adversary.  Herz was pessimistic during 
the Cold War that Washington and Moscow would follow such policies, but he 
had hoped that the end of the Cold War might lead to a lessening of the security 
dilemma.  However, these hopes quickly retreated into a deep pessimism as the 
United States adopted policies which he considered had exacerbated security 
competition and increased the risk of nuclear war.  After considering the matter 
for half a century, Herz, at the start of the twenty-first century, felt that the idea 
of the security dilemma had never been more important to an enlightened 
statecraft.  Yet he was in despair that state leaders, especially policy-makers in 
the Bush Administration, would have the empathetic knowledge to realise it. 
 
Security Dilemma Sensibility 
 
Herz and Butterfield disagreed on the possibilities for mitigating2 the security 
dilemma, but they shared the same assumptions about what created it.  At the 
heart of the security dilemma was the inescapable uncertainty that confronted 
governments about the motives and intentions of others.  Herz argued in his 
1951 book Political Realism and Political Idealism that it was the „uncertainty and 
anxiety‟ about the intentions of others that „places man in this basic dilemma‟ of 
“kill or perish”, of attacking first or running the risk of being destroyed.‟3  
Consequently, those committed to the status quo, knowing that their survival 
depended on their success in a struggle for power, would feel compelled to behave 
aggressively.   
 
It is fatalist4 reasoning of this kind that led John Mearsheimer to claim 
Herz as a progenitor of the theory of offensive realism,5 and the following passage 
provides powerful ammunition for this view.  In an article in 1950, Herz explained 
the pernicious consequences of the security dilemma in the following terms: 
 
Wherever…anarchic society has existed…there has arisen what 
may be called the „security dilemma‟ of men, or groups, or their 
leaders. Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must 
be, and usually are, concerned about their security from being 
attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and 
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individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack, they are 
driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the 
impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others 
more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since 
none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing 
units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security 
and power accumulation is on.6 
 
His reflections about the states system led him to the conclusion that there was 
„apparently no escape from this vicious circle‟ of the security dilemma; he believed 
it a necessary consequence of social life.7  Particular groups may be able to 
escape the dilemma, but such an escape is not universally possible: „ultimately, 
somewhere, the conflicts caused by the security dilemma are bound to emerge 
among political units of power.‟8   
 
 Writing at the same time as Herz (but there is no evidence that he was 
aware of the former‟s thinking on the security dilemma), Butterfield‟s contribution 
was to elucidate the psychological dynamics that constitute the „irreducible 
dilemma‟ (he never used the actual term „security dilemma‟).  Butterfield‟s 
originality was to show how governments with peaceful/defensive intent 
conspired (through their failure to see themselves as others saw them) to provoke 
other governments to behave in ways that raised the level of mutual insecurity.  
The following much-quoted passage reveals how he thought a spiral of mistrust 
could develop between two actors even when neither had malign intentions 
towards the other: 
 
For you know that you yourself mean him no harm, and that you 
want nothing from him save guarantees for your own safety; and 
it is never possible for you to realize or remember properly that 
since he cannot see the inside of your mind, he can never have 
the same assurance of your intentions that you have. As this 
operates on both sides the Chinese puzzle is complete in all its 
interlockings – and neither party sees the nature of the 
predicament he is in, for each only imagines that the other party 
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is being hostile and unreasonable. It is even possible for each to 
feel that the other is wilfully withholding the guarantees that 
would have enabled him to have a sense of security.9 
 
The escape from the „irreducible dilemma‟ lay in governments understanding that 
others are behaving in what appears to be strategically hostile ways because they 
are fearful, not because they have aggressive or predatory intentions.  But it was 
exactly this avenue of escape that Butterfield saw as closed off to policy-makers 
and diplomats.  Butterfield wrote in a passage that goes to the heart of our 
enquiry here: „It is the peculiar characteristic of the situation I am describing – 
the situation of what I should call Hobbesian fear – that you yourself may vividly 
feel the terrible fear that you have of the other party, but you cannot enter into 
the other man‟s counter-fear, or even understand why he should be particularly 
nervous.‟10  For Butterfield, then, decision-makers are unable to exercise the 
empathy to mitigate and escape the security dilemma because they are operating 
with powerfully ingrained peaceful/defensive self-images.11   
 
 Herz agreed with Butterfield that it was the inability of policy-makers to 
„enter into the [other‟s] counter-fear‟ that drove mutual suspicion and fear.  
However, as the passage below shows, he also believed contra Butterfield that it 
was possible for two sides caught in such a predicament to not only understand 
these security dilemma dynamics (that is, hostility driven by mutual fear) but also 
act upon this knowledge in order to promote mutual security.  In the first 
discussion of its kind in the literature on security dilemma theorising, Herz wrote: 
 
Both sides might even profit from the security dilemma itself, or, 
rather, from facing and understanding it. For, if it is true – as 
Butterfield has pointed out – that inability to put oneself into the 
other fellow‟s place and to realize his fears and distrust has 
always constituted one chief reason for the dilemma‟s poignancy, 
it would then follow that elucidation of this fact might by itself 
enable one to do what so far has proved impossible – to put 
oneself into the other‟s place, to understand that he, too, may be 
motivated by one‟s own kind of fears, and thus to abate the fear. 
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This would not resolve the dilemma entirely, of course, for one 
could never be entirely certain; but it might at least take some of 
the sting out of it and insert a wedge toward a more rational, less 
fear-ridden, less ideology-laden, and less emotion-beset attitude 
through a kind of psychoanalysis in the international field where 
lifting one factor into the realm of the conscious might become 
part of the healing process.12 
 
In suggesting that through ‘facing and understanding‟ security dilemma 
dynamics, decision-makers might ameliorate the fear and suspicion which drives 
security competition, Herz blazed a trail that later security dilemma theorists 
have followed.  The most important voice here has been Robert Jervis who wrote 
in 1978 that „The dilemma will operate much more strongly if statesmen do not 
understand it, and do not see that their arms – sought only to secure the status 
quo – may alarm others and that others may arm, not because they are 
contemplating aggression, but because they fear attack from the first state‟.13 
 
In appealing to decision-makers to place themselves in the shoes of their 
enemy, Herz was echoing a long line of military thinkers, stretching back to Sun 
Tzu, who have argued that such empathy was the key to military victory.  
However, what distinguished Herz‟s contribution was that he wanted policy-
makers to empathise with their enemies - not to destroy them - but to begin a 
„healing process‟ of building trust.  The priority that Herz gave to leaders 
understanding the fears of their adversaries, and then acting to reassure and not 
frighten them shows the importance he placed on agency in mitigating the 
security dilemma.  This is a crucial argument because the theme of agency is too 
easily suppressed in security dilemma theorising.14  His idea of empathy as the 
key to mitigating the security dilemma is one that he did not develop himself, and 
it did not get seriously taken up in International Relations scholarship during the 
Cold War and even afterwards.  However, one attempt to expand this particular 
idea is the concept of „security dilemma sensibility‟, which might be defined as 
follows:  
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Security dilemma sensibility is an actor‟s intention and 
capacity to perceive the motives behind, and to show 
responsiveness towards, the potential complexity of the 
military intentions of others. In particular, it refers to the 
ability to understand the role that fear might play in their 
attitudes and behaviour, including, crucially, the role that 
one‟s own actions may play in provoking that fear.15 
 
Security dilemma sensibility is not a panacea for the achievement of mutual 
security between adversaries, and it is important to realise that there are always 
risks and dangers – though these will vary from case to case - in seeking to 
promote cooperation and trust between enemies that can do each other enormous 
harm.  Herz appreciated this stark reality from the outset, and he alerted us to 
two fundamental problems in operationalising what we call security dilemma 
sensibility (or what Herz called „a kind of psychoanalysis in the international 
field‟) that have divided security dilemma theorists, and which continue to bedevil 
policy-makers.   
 
 The first difficulty, as Herz explained, is that even if a government 
considers that its own actions have provoked fear on the part of another state, 
„This would not resolve the dilemma entirely...for one could never be entirely 
certain‟16 that this assessment of the other‟s motives and intentions was correct.  
There can be no guarantee that one is not dealing with a government motivated 
by what Herz called „interests that go beyond security proper‟ (his archetypal case 
was Nazi Germany).17  The worry here is that in order to dampen down security 
competition, a government seeking to exercise security dilemma sensibility has to 
effectively signal a state‟s peaceful/defensive intentions – what contemporary US 
security dilemma theorists call „signalling type‟.18  But these are exactly the kind 
of moves that might place a status quo orientated state in danger of being 
attacked or coerced, if the other side turns out to have aggressive intent.19 
 
Even if decision-makers are confident that another state‟s intentions are 
currently peaceful, can they be equally confident that this will be the case in the 
future when new leaders with different polices might be in power?  This was the 
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second trouble that Herz identified in promoting an empathetic statecraft, and he 
was the first writer on the security dilemma to draw attention to what has 
become known as the problem of future uncertainty.  He argued that even if 
governments could enter into the counter-fear of others, and promote policies of 
mutual reassurance, „how could [they] „trust in the continuance of good 
intentions in the case of collective entities with leaders and policies forever 
changing?‟ His gloomy answer, echoed by contemporary offensive realists, was 
that leaders had to maximise their power against potential enemies and be 
prepared for “the worst”.‟20 
 
Overcoming the barriers of current and especially future uncertainty 
remains the major challenge facing decision-makers seeking to build trust with 
their adversaries.  Herz‟s emphasis in International Politics in the Atomic Age on 
the urgency of the superpowers developing such trust has to be seen against the 
backdrop of his claim during the Cold War that „bipolarity has given the security 
dilemma its utmost poignancy‟, and that nowhere has this manifested itself in a 
more frightening way than in the sphere of armaments, and crucially nuclear 
weapons.21  But if the historically unprecedented condition of nuclear weapons 
and bipolarity created great fear and mistrust between the rival blocs, could 
decision-makers in each of the opposing camps do anything other than assume 
the worst in relation to the motives and intentions of the other?  Or, could Herz‟s 
hopes for an empathetic statecraft on the part of the United States and the Soviet 
Union triumph over the fatalist logic of the security dilemma?   
 
Preventive nuclear war or ‘mutual accommodation’? 
 
The starting point for Herz‟s thinking about nuclear weapons was that they 
completely revolutionised statecraft.22  Their immense destructive power, and the 
lack of any viable defence against these weapons, meant that the territorial state 
which had hitherto provided a state‟s citizens with security against external 
enemies could no longer serve that function.  „Even the most highly organized and 
most strongly armed country or group of countries‟, Herz wrote, „can now be 
destroyed without the necessity of first breaking the traditional “hard shell” of 
surrounding defense.‟23  The logical inference to be drawn from this was that if 
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the state could no longer provide security in an age of nuclear weapons, then a 
new protective unit will have to be sought.  The only candidate here is some type 
of international authority, even a world state itself.  Herz recognised the ultimate 
logic of this solution to the nuclear threat.  He envisaged a „supernational 
authority‟, possessing in the transitional period a monopoly of nuclear weapons, 
but then destroying them as part of creating a new global regime of nuclear 
abolition.  He recognised that for sovereign states to take such steps would 
constitute „a most radical transformation of attitudes and approach‟,24 but he 
believed that what might once have been considered idealistic was now the only 
realistic way to ensure survival.25  But it would be wrong, as Daniel Deudney 
does, to solely associate Herz with this interpretation of the nuclear 
predicament.26   
 
Herz also knew that the nuclear armed powers would be very reluctant to 
give up their nuclear weapons, and he considered this a prudent response to the 
security dilemma which had „reached its ultimate dimension‟ in the nuclear age.27  
He critiqued as „utopian‟ those radical schemes advocating global nuclear 
disarmament for their blindness to the security dilemma.  He cautioned that the 
security dilemma would be felt most urgently in a nuclear disarmed world 
because „nobody would be able to resist the urge to evade and conceal, if merely 
for reasons of security, and the ensuing uncertainties and suspicions might 
render conditions more unstable than they would be at higher armament levels.‟28  
These criticisms of nuclear disarmament as utopian did not change his conviction 
that only „global authority‟ could solve the problem of protection in the nuclear 
age, but he also recognised that it would be dangerous to make the „jump‟ in the 
absence of mutual trust between the units.29    
 
 Herz‟s fatalist voice was never stronger than when he argued that since 
neither superpower could feel secure if its competitor could attack it with nuclear 
weapons, the only logic was „destruction of the other power in “preventive war”‟ – 
„kill or perish‟ indeed.  And the „radical conclusion‟ he drew from this depiction of 
the nuclear security dilemma was that ‘nothing short of global rule can ultimately 
satisfy the security interest of any one power, and particularly any superpower’.30  
Such a prognosis offered no attenuation of the security dilemma since its 
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dynamics now promised to operate at fever pitch as each side struggled endlessly 
to place itself in a position where it could deliver the deadly knock-out blow, 
without this also leading to its own annihilation.   
 
 However, Herz also identified a competing nuclear logic which led him to 
conclude that, „The means through which the end [global rule] would have to be 
attained defeats the end itself’.  Far from a preventive nuclear war leading to „one 
unit‟s global control of a pacified world‟, Herz predicted „mutual annihilation‟ for 
both superpowers.31  And it followed that if both sides were like Robert 
Oppenheimer‟s two scorpions in the bottle – „each capable of killing the other, but 
only at the risk of his own life‟,32 then the search for superiority was militarily 
and politically pointless.  Herz quickly recognised that in an age where both side‟s 
cities were hostages to the nuclear weapons of the other, „what realistically has to 
be assumed...is not superiority (or any specific superiorities in detail) but that 
stalemate under conditions of “atomic plenty” or “saturation” which derives from 
the mutual capacity to retaliate with “absolute” power.‟33 Yet he did not pursue 
the implications of this logic for the security dilemma.  But far from the latter 
reaching its apogee with the emergence of nuclear bipolarity, mutual deterrence 
significantly mitigates its effects,34 opening the door to those polices of „mutual 
accommodation‟ that Herz saw as the only basis for avoiding nuclear destruction. 
 
Herz viewed the art of diplomacy as essential to crafting a new superpower 
detente built on the overriding common interest in avoiding nuclear war.  This 
could only be a „holding operation‟ pending the radical transformation in attitudes 
which would make governments finally realise that sovereignty can no longer 
protect them in the nuclear age.  And here he felt that the transition to what he 
called „universalist statesmanship‟ would require leaders who could act as 
„caretakers‟ of their „particular units and simultaneously‟ act as „representatives‟ 
of global humanity.35  This vision could only be realised if the superpowers 
developed a lasting detente, and this depended upon both sides appreciating that 
their own actions were threatening to the other – in short, the intention and 
capacity to exercise security dilemma sensibility. 
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I discussed above the difficulties that face governments in operationalising 
security dilemma sensibility, but what concerned Herz during the Cold War was 
whether the leaders of both superpowers could understand the role that their 
own actions were playing in making the other fearful and insecure.  Herz argued 
that what blocked such an understanding on both sides was their shared belief 
that they faced an ideological foe committed to their destruction.  Herz rejected 
such ideological stereotyping on the part of the United States and the Soviet 
Union, believing that it could only lead to atomic destruction. 
 
Having initially been encouraged by the detente that developed between the 
superpowers in the early 1970s, he cautioned a few years later that the fledgling 
US-Soviet experiment in security cooperation was opposed by the military on both 
sides.36  He was particularly critical of the SALT I Treaty for not radically cutting 
nuclear stockpiles, arguing that mutual deterrence could function at a fraction of 
the weapon numbers.  The problem was that neither superpower could accept a 
situation which, as Henry Kissinger once described it, required the United States 
and Soviet Union to „deliberately [rest] their security on each other‟s 
vulnerability‟.37  Perhaps acceptance of this mutual hostage relationship would 
have been easier if each side had not viewed the other as seeking global 
domination, but as it was, the belief that the US-Soviet competition was a zero-
sum game even played itself out in the realm of nuclear weaponry.  Herz grimly 
reflected in 1989 that each superpower had sought to escape their dependence 
upon their nuclear adversary by developing ever more sophisticated weapons in 
the search „”first- strike capacities”...[ideas about] “prevailing” in nuclear war‟, 
and even „fantasies of being able to restore the old “hard shell” of impermeability 
through space-based shields of defense (SDI).‟  He judged that as a consequence 
of these developments, the risks of an actual major nuclear exchange „has 
increased immeasurably‟.38   
 
Herz‟s warnings about the growing risks of nuclear war would have been 
apposite had they been issued at the beginning of the decade.  At that time, the 
newly elected Reagan Administration talked cavalierly about „prevailing‟ in a 
nuclear war.  This reflected Washington‟s belief that the Soviet leadership was 
ideologically committed to the destruction of US values and interests, and that it 
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believed nuclear superiority could help it achieve this goal.39  However, such fears 
about impending nuclear peril seem curious in the context of the late 1980s, 
since by this time, President Reagan and the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had 
replaced Cold War antagonism with relations of mutual trust.   
 
Moreover, Reagan and Gorbachev had achieved this remarkable feat by 
that very „abatement of ideological conflict‟ and understanding of the „“other 
fellow‟s” fear and distrust‟40 which Herz had seen as the key to mitigating the 
security dilemma.  And whilst Herz‟s earlier foreboding that such a 
transformation would only come about after the „impact of [a] nuclear war‟41 did 
not thankfully come to pass, the increasing fears of general nuclear war that 
developed in the early 1980s, on both sides of the Cold war divide, was a crucial 
factor in leading Reagan and Gorbachev to lead their countries away from the 
abyss of nuclear destruction. 
 
From fear to trust: security dilemma sensibility and the end of the Cold War 
 
The growing fear of nuclear war in Moscow and Washington in the early 1980s is 
a textbook illustration of Butterfield‟s notion of „Hobbesian Fear‟.  Both 
superpowers saw themselves as on the defensive against an implacable foe, and 
each failed to appreciate that its own actions were provoking fear and insecurity 
on the part of the other.  There was no security dilemma sensibility exercised on 
either side because both the White House and the Kremlin remained in the grip of 
mindsets which determined that the other side‟s ideology committed it to 
unremitting hostility.  Neither side, then, worried that their actions might be 
provoking fear and distrust in the other because both had settled on an 
interpretation of the other side‟s motives and intentions as an aggressor state.  
But the inability of United States and Soviet leaders to recognise that their 
mutual hostility might stem from security dilemma dynamics, and not predatory 
ambition, was compounded still further by the fact that neither side could accept 
that the other really believed it to be a threat.  The problem, as Butterfield had 
first appreciated, is that a government with a peaceful/defensive self-image 
makes the flawed assumption that its adversary will always know this to be the 
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case.  Consequently, it will interpret any hostile behaviour on the part of states 
with such „knowledge‟ as indicating aggressive intent.42   
 
The dangers of a peaceful/defensive self-image were well illustrated by 
Caspar Weinberger, US Secretary of Defence when remarking about Soviet fears 
of US plans to develop a space-based defence against missiles.  „The Russians‟, 
Weinberger said, had „no need to worry‟ about Reagan‟s announcement in March 
1983 of the „Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) because „they know perfectly well 
that we will never launch a first strike on the Soviet Union.‟43  But those who are 
targeted by such weapon systems are not so easily reassured.  And because the 
Kremlin believed that US leaders knew that they did not plan to attack the United 
States or its allies, they concluded that the comprehensive US arms build-up in 
the first Reagan Administration must be offensive in nature.  Yet from 
Washington‟s point of view, US plans to deploy a new generation of nuclear 
weapons (the MX, Trident D-5 and the Cruise and Pershing II missiles) was a 
defensive response to Soviet nuclear modernisation in the 1970s, and was aimed 
at neutralising what the first Reagan Administration viewed as Moscow‟s pursuit 
of nuclear superiority.44 
 
 Given this level of fear and distrust, what changed to enable the Cold War 
adversaries to establish a new relationship of trust?  The answer is that Ronald 
Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev showed both the intention and capacity to enter 
into the counter-fear of their adversary, with spectacular results in terms of the 
transformation of East-West relations.   
 
It was Reagan‟s growing fear of nuclear war that led him to realise the 
importance of both the United States and the Soviet Union exercising security 
dilemma sensibility.  The crucial event was the Abel Archer crisis of November 
1983 which brought the world closer to nuclear war than it had been since the 
Cuban missile crisis.  In an annual exercise, NATO simulated its nuclear release 
procedures, but in the climate of heightened fear and suspicion, the Kremlin 
believed that it might be the countdown to a US nuclear attack against the Soviet 
Union.45  The crisis had a transformational impact on Reagan‟s thinking in that 
he came to understand the role that fear might be playing in Soviet attitudes and 
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behaviour, and crucially, he came to appreciate that Moscow did not accept the 
White House‟s peaceful/defensive self-image.46  This was evident in Reagan‟s 
remarks after reading a US intelligence report on the intense Soviet fears in 1983.  
According to a number of sources, the President commented to his National 
Security Advisor, Robert McFarlane: „Do you suppose they really believe that. I 
don‟t see how they would believe that. But it‟s something to think about‟.47  
Reagan could not recognise this image of the United States as an aggressor state, 
and the crisis forced him to realise that the Soviet leadership did not see the 
United States as it saw itself. 
 
 The near catastrophe of Abel Archer led Reagan to a new understanding of 
how mutual fear and distrust between the superpowers could lead to nuclear 
war.  As Beth Fischer has argued, „Nuclear Fears brought about nuclear 
learning‟.48  Reagan later reflected in his memoirs, in a passage that showed an 
important awareness of security dilemma dynamics, that „there were myths and 
misconceptions that had contributed to misunderstandings and our potentially 
fatal mistrust of each other‟.49  Having realised that the Soviet Union could so 
misunderstand US intentions as to believe that Washington was preparing to 
launch a nuclear first-strike, Reagan was anxious to get a Russian leader in a 
room so as to reassure them as to US peaceful intentions.50   
 
Mikhail Gorbachev‟s accession to the leadership of the Soviet Union in 
March 1985 provided Reagan with an interlocutor who shared his desire for 
better relations.  Moreover, as Gorbachev was to show at their summit at 
Reykjavik a year later, he was also committed to ridding the world of nuclear 
weapons.  If the emotion of fear had led Reagan to the exercise of security 
dilemma sensibility, Gorbachev and his advisers showed a highly developed 
capacity for security dilemma sensibility from the beginning.  Gorbachev realised 
that even though the Soviet Union might profess defensive intent, its enemies 
were not so easily reassured in the face of Soviet conventional and nuclear 
capabilities.   
 
Gorbachev made that imaginative leap which Butterfield had said was 
impossible, and developed policies that entered into the counter-fear of the 
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United States and NATO.  He rejected the „ideological fundamentalism‟51 that 
depicted the United States as inherently aggressive, and acknowledged that 
Soviet actions, especially its build-up of nuclear and conventional capabilities in 
the 1970s, had increased Western fears and insecurity.  This, in turn, had led to 
a new wave of United States and NATO military modernisation, creating a vicious 
and increasingly dangerous circle of security competition.  But instead of 
responding to this with yet a further round of Soviet military escalations, thereby 
perpetuating the spiralling distrust, Gorbachev called for new policies which 
recognised that „Security cannot be built endlessly on fear of retaliation…security 
can only be mutual…The highest wisdom is not in caring exclusively for oneself, 
especially to the detriment of the other side. It is vital that all should feel equally 
secure.‟52   
 
Reagan and Gorbachev met for the first time at Geneva in November 1985.  
Those involved later stressed how important the meeting had been in encouraging 
the two leaders to believe they could work with each other.53  Gorbachev himself 
recalled that „our dialogue was very constructive…and increasingly friendly the 
better we got to know each other.‟54  The most important outcome of the summit 
was that each pledged that neither side would „seek military superiority‟.55  This 
was a decisive rejection of the nuclear war-fighting policies that had characterised 
the first Reagan Administration, and an acknowledgment of the reality that the 
only security in the nuclear age was common security.  For the first time since 
the nuclear age began, the superpowers had leaders committed to acting as 
Herz‟s „caretakers‟ of the global interest in nuclear survival. 
 
The two leaders met again a year later at Reykjavik, when they came 
tantalisingly close to abolishing all nuclear weapons.  The great paradox of 
Reagan was that the veteran Cold War warrior also harboured a lifelong dream to 
rid the world of nuclear weapons.56  This explains his obsessive commitment to 
SDI which he genuinely believed was a defensive weapon that would „give us the 
means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.57  Both men 
were prepared at Reykjavik to eliminate their countries‟ nuclear arsenals, 
indicating the scale of the transformation in US-Soviet relations since the time 
when Herz had criticised the superpowers for failing to make radical cuts in SALT 
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I.  But what stopped these two nuclear abolitionists from reaching such a 
momentous agreement was Reagan‟s insistence that nuclear disarmament 
proceed in tandem with the development and testing of SDI.58   
 
Gorbachev‟s predecessors had believed that SDI was being developed to 
support a first strike strategy.  Gorbachev shared this worry about the offensive 
potentialities of SDI, but he accepted that Reagan only saw SDI in defensive 
terms.59  But what worried Gorbachev, and especially the Soviet military, was 
whether future US leaders would view SDI in such equally benign terms.  It was 
the future uncertainty issue discussed earlier that significantly motivated 
Gorbachev‟s opposition to SDI at Reykjavik.  The Soviet leader revealed these 
anxieties when he said to Reagan at the summit: „If I return to Moscow and say 
that I agreed to allow you to test in the atmosphere and in space, they would call 
me a fool and not a leader‟.60   
 
Reagan and Gorbachev‟s deep disagreement over SDI prevented them from 
reaching a historic agreement on the abolition of nuclear arms.  However, both 
leaders came away from the summit strengthened in their trust in each other.  
Gorbachev told George Shultz in 1992 that the turning point in bringing about 
the end of the Cold War was Reykjavik.61  This was confirmed by Gorbachev‟s 
close advisor, Anatoly Chernyaev, who reflected that „A spark of understanding 
was born between them, as if they had winked to each other about the future‟.62  
Such sentiments were shared by Reagan who wrote in his memoirs that „Looking 
back now, its clear there was a chemistry between Gorbachev and me that 
produced something very close to a friendship‟.63   
 
The best evidence of this growing trust was Gorbachev‟s decision a year 
later to allow progress on the nuclear arms control front, despite continuing 
disagreement between the superpowers over SDI.  This Soviet concession led to 
the United States and the Soviet Union signing the INF Agreement in December 
1987, and paved the way for the signing of the START Treaty (under Reagan‟s 
successor) in July 1991.  And contrary to Herz‟s fears at the end of the 1980s 
regarding the drift to nuclear war, the elimination of MIRVed ICBMs in START I 
significantly reduced the risks of either side launching a nuclear first-strike.   
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Herz had anticipated such a transformation in superpower relations in the 
late 1950s, though he had clearly hoped that it would not take another three 
decades to achieve.  Having identified the core problems of current and especially 
future uncertainty as barriers to leaders putting themselves in the shoes of their 
enemies, Herz did not offer us his own ideas about how two nuclear armed 
enemies could build trust.  As discussed earlier, leaders rarely have the 
confidence to make significant unilateral moves to signal their state‟s 
peaceful/defensive intentions, for fear that they would be exposed to great danger 
if their act of trust proved misplaced.  If this is the case, how then do we explain 
the trust-building moves made by Gorbachev in the period after the Geneva 
Summit, and crucially, the Soviet leader‟s decision to de-link SDI from agreement 
on INF and START?  In other words, why was Gorbachev so confident that his 
moves would not be exploited by the United States?   
 
Chernyaev wrote in his diary in early 1986 that Gorbachev was „taking this 
gamble because [the Soviet leader believed that] nobody is going to attack us even 
if we disarm completely‟.64  But even if Gorbachev believed this, there were others 
in the Kremlin who were far less certain about US motives and intentions.  Given 
these suspicions, it is evident that had Reagan not abandoned the hostile policies 
of his first term, Gorbachev would not have been able to pursue his „new 
thinking‟ on security.65  Even so, what seems to have reassured the Politburo that 
Moscow‟s cooperative moves would not be exploited by Washington was the 
„margin of safety‟66 provided by Soviet nuclear capabilities.67  This is not to 
devalue the significance of Gorbachev‟s exercise of security dilemma sensibility: 
after all, his predecessors had proven incapable of showing a similar level of 
empathetic intention and capacity.  However, the Reagan-Gorbachev relationship 
does raise the question as to whether a margin of safety is a crucial pre-requisite 
for building trust between nuclear enemies. 
 
Reagan and Gorbachev felt confident about the peaceful/defensive 
intentions of each other‟s countries, but there was the question as to whether 
their successors would be able to maintain the trust they had built up.  Herz‟s 
hope that the end of the Cold War might represent a „ray of hope at the horizon‟68 
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quickly gave way to pessimism that once again, far from ameliorating the security 
dilemma, the United States was embarking on policies that could only deepen it.   
 
In a letter to Kenneth Thompson written in 1993, Herz set out his belief 
that despite the thawing of superpower relations, the threat of a nuclear war has 
„hardly lessened, unless radical nuclear disarmament can be achieved, and 
further proliferation be prevented‟.69  With the Soviet Union gone, Herz had hoped 
that the United States would finally put its enormous political weight behind 
radical cuts in the world‟s nuclear arsenals.  However, far from the United States 
and Russia massively slashing their arsenals to both reflect their increasing 
cooperation and contribute to it, neither side showed any great enthusiasm for 
the level of reductions that Herz felt were urgently required.   
 
A window for radical – but stabilising – nuclear cuts had once again opened 
up for Washington and Moscow, but there were no leaders this time with Reagan 
and Gorbachev‟s commitment to nuclear abolition.  Rather, US planning and 
strategy at this time was shaped by the dark shadow of future uncertainty 
regarding Russian and Chinese intentions as well as insuring against new 
nuclear armed challengers to US interests.70  Jonathan Schell has captured the 
way in which US nuclear war-planning was virtually unaffected by the demise of 
the Soviet Union.  „With or without a global antagonist‟, he wrote, „nuclear policy 
and the arsenal that supported it would remain essentially unchanged‟.71  The 
ideological antagonism which had prevented US policy-makers from entering into 
the Soviet Union‟s counter-fear might have been a relic of the Cold War, but there 
was equally little space for security dilemma sensibility in the new circumstances 
given Washington‟s belief that its nuclear arsenal was the ultimate hedge against 
the problem of future uncertainty itself.72  
 
The continuing importance that successive post-Cold War US 
administrations placed on maintaining a large US nuclear arsenal could only 
contribute to the problem of controlling nuclear proliferation.  This is not to say 
that states like India and Pakistan were influenced in their decisions in the late 
1980s to proliferate by the size of the US nuclear stockpile, but it is to argue that 
New Delhi and Islamabad would in all probability have approached the decision 
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to move into the nuclear club very differently had the United States and Russia 
been radically cutting their arsenals – and ostensibly aiming at zero.73   
 
Herz had identified nuclear proliferation as a major risk to global security 
in the post-Cold War world, but this reflected a concern of his that can be dated 
back to the early 1960s.  At that time, he had warned that even if one could have 
some confidence in „rational calculation‟ in a bipolar world, the spread of the 
bomb would lead to „complete instability...[and] an indefinite and infinite 
extension of risks of error, of action in madness, or in despair, or out of spite, or 
for reasons of domestic policy, or – especially in the case of conflicts between 
smaller powers – for the sake of local or regional policy.‟74  Far from the entry into 
the nuclear club of India and Pakistan increasing mutual security (as some have 
argued), he contended that this decision had diminished security for both 
states.75  Herz, as a founder member of the camp of what later become known as 
„proliferation pessimism‟, had argued for over four decades that the only solution 
to the nuclear peril was the creation of a new international authority leading to 
abolition.  His pessimism about the world achieving this was never deeper than in 
the anxieties he expressed in the early 2000s about the policies of the Bush 
Administration.   
 
The Bush Doctrine and the Security Dilemma 
 
Writing in 2003, in his last published article on the security dilemma, Herz 
offered a scathing critique of President George W. Bush‟s foreign policy.  And just 
as he had argued that ideological antagonism was the barrier to „mutual 
accommodation‟ during the Cold War, he considered that it was the „ideological 
guidance of the White House and the Pentagon‟ with their policy of securing 
„global hegemony through maintaining an incontestable strategic superiority‟ 
which was fuelling insecurity and war at the beginning of the new century.  Here, 
he was highly critical of the Bush doctrine of „pre-emption‟ which, as he 
appreciated, is better described as a strategy of preventive war.76  He dubbed the 
Bush doctrine a case of „extreme „“realism”‟, and whenever Herz encountered 
such extremes of either idealism or realism, he was always pulled towards the 
opposite pole.  Faced with what he saw as the dangerous and self-defeating 
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policies of the Bush Administration, he called once more for that „radical turn in 
attitudes and policies‟77 which he saw as essential if humanity was to survive the 
new century.     
 
Herz would have been dismayed to think that his ideas were in any way 
comparable to those of the Bush Administration, but it will be recalled that his 
fatalist voice had hypothesised in his earliest post-1945 reflections that only a 
strategy of „preventive war‟ could make a state secure against an adversary‟s 
nuclear weapons.  This was especially the case for a superpower.  He rejected 
such thinking as a counsel of despair leading to mutual annihilation, but it is the 
underlying logic of „kill or perish‟ that underpinned the Bush doctrine as it 
evolved after 2000.  The terror attacks of September 11, 2001, revolutionised the 
US approach to nuclear threats.  The fear that the next attack might be by a 
terrorist group with a nuclear weapon, and that such actions might be supported 
by nuclear-armed „rogue states‟, led the United States to adopt the position that it 
could only be secure if it eliminated such nuclear risks to the US homeland.78 
 
Global abolition and effective international control of the atom was Herz‟s 
solution to the nuclear dilemma, but the Bush Administration was dismissive of 
resting US security on the fragile institutions of international law and 
disarmament.  Instead, the United States would actively prevent those it viewed 
as ideological enemies – by military force and regime change if necessary - from 
acquiring the capability to threaten the United States and its allies with nuclear 
weapons.  In his 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush described Iraq, 
Iran, and North Korea as the „Axis of Evil‟.  Believing that the internal character of 
these so-called „rogue‟ states committed them to the export of aggression and 
terror, and that there could be no long-term accommodation between the United 
States and such regimes, the Bush Administration defended a policy of preventive 
war and regime change.  Bush warned, „I will not wait on events, while dangers 
gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of 
America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with 
the world‟s most destructive weapons‟.79   
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As a strategy for ending proliferation, the Bush Doctrine has been a signal 
failure.  The war against Iraq served to intensify the proliferation efforts on the 
part of the two states that were the source of the greatest concern at the 
beginning of the decade, namely, North Korea and Iran.  The DPRK left the NPT in 
early 2003, and three years later announced its entry into the nuclear cabal by 
testing a weapon.  The logic of this path had been set out by a North Korean 
general before the Iraq War, when he had said in response to a question as to 
why the DPRK was developing nuclear weapons: „We see what you are getting 
ready to do with Iraq.  And you are not going to do it to us‟.80  Iran was less 
blatant, but the offensive US policy underlined the strategic wisdom in Tehran of 
not caving into US demands that it cease its ostensibly peaceful activities of 
uranium enrichment.  The latter is crucial to any future Iranian nuclear weapons 
programme, should the Islamic Republic take the momentous political decision to 
develop the bomb. 
 
Perhaps the Bush Administration‟s revolutionary approach to nuclear 
threats would have fared better if the Iraq war – the first test of ending 
proliferation through regime change - had not turned out to be such a political 
and military disaster for the United States.  The United States, as Schell has 
argued, was the first country to proclaim force and regime change as „the means 
for solving the world‟s proliferation problem.‟81  However, this goal depended upon 
others being so frightened by the power of the United States that they submitted 
to Washington‟s will, but the failure of regime change in Iraq showed the 
enormous gap between the administration‟s aspirations to global superiority, and 
its capacities to deliver this.82 
 
 Herz would not have been surprised by this outcome since he had 
predicted that the Bush doctrine would lead to an „immense increase in the 
security dilemmas of countries which are potential targets.‟83  He did not say it, 
but the logical corollary of this was that if the Bush Administration had 
understood security dilemma dynamics, Washington would not have been 
charting such a dangerous and self-defeating course.  However, even if US policy-
makers had been aware of security dilemma theory, the administration in its first 
term took the view that it faced in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea states that were 
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not acting out of fear and mistrust, but rather predatory ambition rooted in the 
internal character of their regimes.  Consequently, US policy-makers believed that 
the exercise of security dilemma sensibility would have been both wrong-headed 
and dangerous.   
 
The problem with ideological fundamentalism of the kind displayed by the 
Bush White House is that it closes down the possibility that others might be 
acting out of fear and mistrust rather than malevolence, and crucially, it 
disregards the role that one‟s own actions have played in provoking that fear.84  It 
is little wonder, then, that Herz was so pessimistic about the Bush 
Administration‟s foreign policy since this failure to understand security dilemma 
dynamics was what he had repeatedly warned against during the Cold War.  He 
took it as a given that the Cold War was a product of security dilemma dynamics 
(that is, hostility driven by Butterfield‟s „Hobbesian fear‟),85 but this position 
rested uneasily with his belief that one can never really know the motives and 
intentions of others.  What is more, he never explicitly returned in his later 
writings on the superpowers‟ nuclear relationship to the question of whether 
decision-makers could enter into the counter-fear of their enemies given the 
obstacles of current and future uncertainty.  Instead, he called for the 
superpowers to relax the ideological fundamentalist mindsets which were 
standing in the way of mutual accommodation (what he called „mitigation‟).  This 
had occurred in a spectacular fashion in the second half of the 1980s, but what 
engrossed Herz was how the lone superpower, in its response to the challenge of 
proliferation in a post 9/11 world, was repeating the failed and dangerous 
policies of the Cold War.   
 
Late in his life he commented that he had been „greatly surprised‟86 to 
discover that the concept of the security dilemma enjoyed such prominence 
among academics (the onset of reading blindness in his eighties prevented him 
from keeping up with the academic debate as much as he would have liked).  But 
he was well aware that security dilemma arguments did not have the same level 
of appeal to policy-makers.  With the Bush Administration‟s failed policies firmly 
in his sights, he argued that the idea of the security dilemma was „still of great 
importance, today perhaps more than ever‟.87  The challenge that he left us with 
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is how to raise this level of awareness among policy-makers.  The difficulty here is 
that the exercise of security dilemma sensibility remains a rarity because it 
requires policy-makers to both understand how their own defensively motivated 
actions might be seen as threatening by others and to avoid ideological 
stereotyping of their adversaries.  Yet crucially, it also requires leaders who, in 
showing empathetic responsiveness to the security concerns of others, are 
prepared to risk the costs of misplaced trust if their interpretation of an 
adversary‟s behaviour as motivated by fear and not aggression turns out to be 
wrong.  But unless decision-makers are prepared to make a „leap of trust‟88 in 
order to test whether fear and suspicion are the result of security dilemma 
dynamics, they risk becoming trapped in a situation where misplaced suspicion 
leads to spiralling distrust that could have been avoided.    
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